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We start from a realistic notion that most major investments are at least partially irreversible due
to the fact that ¯rms cannot disinvest without costs after having carried out their investment de-
cision. This is because physical capital is not only industry-speci¯c, but also ¯rm-speci¯c so that
it may not be very usable for a di®erent ¯rm in the same industry. Even in the absence of ¯rm-
speci¯c investments, partial irreversibility will quite likely be true due to the "lemons" problem
meaning that the resale value is usually below the purchase cost. In the seminal book by Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) various approaches and applications are excellently reviewed and extended
(see also complementary surveys in terms of further research by Bertola (1998) and Caballero
(1999)). In what follows we focus on an important issue of how taxation will a®ect investment
behavior in the framework of irreversible investments under uncertainty. First we summarize
brie°y what has been done in this literature and after that we present a new research question
concerning the potential role of progressive taxation in terms of optimal investing threshold,
which we elaborate in this paper.
There are several recent studies in the framework of irreversible investment under uncertainty
where justi¯cations for the neutral tax system have been analyzed using real option theory.
Niemann (1999) has shown that in the presence of uncertainty and irreversible investments the
neutrality of both the cash °ow tax and the Johansson-Samuelson tax system hold by extending
the depreciation base. For further discussion about these tax schemes, see e.g. chapter 5 in Sinn
(1987). Pennings (2000) has studied the impact of a subsidy to investment with a taxation of
future pro¯ts on an irreversible investment and has shown that such a combination by raising
a zero expected revenue will decrease the threshold value of investment, so that the expected
investment goes up. Panteghini (2004) compares an ACE (Allowance for Corporate Equity)
system with a CBIT (Comprehensive Business Income Tax) system in an open economy using a
real option approach and suggests that the preference for an ACE system is a realistic result.
One should also ask: what happens if tax rates are uncertain? Niemann (2004) demonstrates
that both under risk neutrality and risk aversion higher tax rate uncertainty has an ambiguous
investment e®ect depending among others on depreciation deductions. Moreover, he shows that
the neutrality results under perfect foresight for the cash °ow tax and the Johansson-Samuelson
tax will also hold under tax rate uncertainty independent of whether investors are risk neutral
or risk averse (see also Niemann and Sureth (2004)). Sureth (2002) investigates the impacts
of taxes using a contingent claims analysis instead of a dynamic programming approach and
shows that uncertainty and complete irreversibility do not violate the neutrality property of a
Johansson-Samuelson tax. He obtains the same ¯nding as Neumann (2004) that the neutrality of
a cash °ow and a Johansson-Samuelson tax system holds also in the case of risk averse investor
behavior. Lund (1992) has also applied the contingent claims analysis to evaluate the impact of
petroleum taxation under uncertainty on companies' behavior. His main focus is in a numerical
approach.
What are the e®ects of corporate tax asymmetries on irreversible investments under a tax
scheme, where tax base is given by the ¯rm's return, net of an imputation rate? This issue
has been studied in Panteghini (2001a), (2001b) and (2002) under various investment strategies.
He has demonstrated that this asymmetric scheme may also be neutral under both income
and capital uncertainty. Neutrality is an implication of Bernanke's (1983) Bad News Principle,
according to which irreversible decisions are a®ected only by unfavorable events. Under the tax
system proposed, the corporate tax is levied in the good states so that tax asymmetries exploit
the asymmetric e®ect of uncertainty to guarantee neutrality.
Alvarez et. al (1998) have analyzed a more general issue in a dynamic stochastic adjustment
model of ¯rm behavior. In particular, they asked: what are the anticipatory e®ects of a corporate
tax reform when the ¯rms are realistically uncertain both about the timing and contents of the
expected reform either in terms of tax cuts or in terms of tax base reductions? They show
among others that future tax cut expectation causes the ¯rms to accelerate optimal investment,
1while expected reduction in the tax base will have an opposite e®ect. In several OECD countries
in the 1980s and 1990s a tax-cut plus base-broadening tax reform has been implemented and
the authors show among others that under plausible assumptions this type of reform cannot be
revenue-neutral. In Alvarez et. al (2000) it is shown that a corporate tax policy in a model with
tax advantage to debt and expectations about a forthcoming tax reform may have signi¯cant
incentive e®ects. In particular, under the assumptions made a tax cut plus base-broadening tax
reform will cause a big short run investment spurt.
Hassett and Metcalf (1999) have studied the impact of tax policy uncertainty, associated for
potential changes in investment tax credits, both on ¯rm level and aggregate investment. Under
geometric Brownian motion of value process higher uncertainty slows down investment despite
the implicit subsidy arising from the variations in tax credit, but when tax policy is modelled
as a stationary jump process higher tax policy uncertainty can have the opposite e®ect. In
both model speci¯cations higher tax policy uncertainty will imply a loss of tax revenues to the
government (see also Metcalf and Hassett (1995)). Agliardi (2001) has assumed the possibility of
investment scrapping so that investment can be considered as partially irreversible, and studied
the impacts of tax policy including a corporate cash °ow tax and a subsidy to asset values also
in the case of tax policy uncertainty. He models the tax policy process in a way alternative to
Hassett and Metcalf (1994) by assuming that the price of capital follows a di®erent stochastic
process. Naturally, he concludes that it may discourage investment and encourage the earlier
shutdown of projects. Brennan and Schwartz (1986) have studied the case of partially reversible
investment for the decision to open or close a mine.
To conclude, in the existing recent literature, where corporation taxation issues have been
studied in the irreversible investment framework under uncertainty by using real option theory,
taxation has been assumed to be proportional. This means that the marginal tax rate and the
average tax rate are constant and therefore equal. But in practice this is not an appropriate
assumption even though the marginal tax rate would be constant if there are tax exemptions
meaning that taxes have to be paid only after some exemption threshold. In this case taxation
is not proportional, but progressive. Therefore, a practically important issue is to ask: what are
the implications of progressive taxation in terms of investment behavior under uncertainty? Tax
progression means either that the marginal tax rate is constant but, due to tax exemption, the
average tax rate increases with the tax base. Another de¯nition of tax progression is that in
terms the tax base the marginal tax rate increases (see e.g. the seminal paper by Musgrave and
Thin (1948) and a textbook analysis in Lambert (2001)).
The purpose of our paper is to analyze the following important issue, which to our best
knowledge has not been previously studied in the literature: what is the impact of tax progression
- de¯ned as a higher average tax rate in terms of tax base - on irreversible investment under
uncertainty? We provide several new and interesting ¯ndings about this practically realistic
modelling of taxation: Under progressive taxation with positive tax rate and tax exemption, we
demonstrate how the impact of the tax rate on the optimal investment threshold depends on
the relative size between the tax exemption and sunk cost of investment. More precisely, if tax
exemption threshold is below the sunk cost of investment, then higher tax rate will increase the
optimal investment threshold and decrease the value of investment opportunity by decreasing
the net-of-tax payo®. The negative relationship under these assumptions is natural; higher tax
rate raises the size of tax deduction, and decreases the marginal revenue from investment project.
Since the latter e®ect dominates whenever the tax exemption threshold is below the sunk cost
of investment, we ¯nd that higher taxation slows down rational investments in that case.
However, when the tax exemption threshold exceeds the sunk cost of irreversible investment,
then depending on the relationship between volatility and other parameters of the problem, there
are three di®erent regimes in terms of optimal investment threshold. First, for a set of su±ciently
low volatilities, increased volatility decelerates investment by increasing the harvesting threshold,
but the tax rate does not a®ect the optimal policy. Second, as volatility becomes larger, the
optimal harvesting threshold coincides with the tax exemption threshold, and therefore becomes
2independent of both volatility and tax rate. Third, for a set of su±ciently high volatilities, the
optimal investment threshold depends again positively on volatility, but interestingly, negatively
on tax rate. Hence, under this latter condition there is "tax paradox", according to which
higher tax rate accelerates rational investment by increasing the current investment incentives!
It is worth noticing that these observations results also from the fact that in our framework
government works as a risk-sharer via tax exemption.
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we present a framework to study the impact of progres-
sive taxation under irreversible investment with stochastic value process and characterize new
theoretical results. Section 3 illustrates our ¯ndings explicitly through numerical calculations.
Finally, there is a concluding section.
2 Tax Exemption and Irreversible Investment
In this section we characterize the optimal irreversible investment problem under stochastic
value process with progressive taxation, i.e. when both the tax rate and the tax exemption are
positive so that the average tax rate increases with the tax base, ceteris paribus. More precisely,
we proceed as follows: First, we specify the underlying value dynamics. Second, we demonstrate
how the impact of the tax rate on the optimal investment threshold depends on the relative
size between the tax exemption and the sunk cost of investment. Third, we state a set of weak
conditions under which higher volatility will increase both the value and the exercise threshold
of the optimal policy. Finally, we also illustrate the signi¯cance of progressive taxation as a
risk-sharing device.
As usually, we assume that the random dynamics of the underlying value process are described
by the It^ o stochastic di®erential equation
dXt = ¹(Xt)dt + ´¾(Xt)dWt; X0 = x (2.1)
where both the drift ¹ : R+ 7! R and the volatility coe±cient ¾ : R+ 7! R+ are assumed to be
su±ciently smooth (at least continuous) mappings for guaranteeing the existence of a solution
for (2.1) and ´ ¸ 0 is a known non-negative multiplier. The underlying value dynamics becomes
deterministic as the volatility multiplier vanishes, that is, as ´ # 0. Moreover, the assumed
positivity of the volatility coe±cient ¾(x) implies that an increase in the value of the multiplier
´ can be interpreted as an increase in the overall volatility of the underlying value dynamics.
In line with standard models applied in economics, we assume that the upper boundary 1 is
natural for Xt. Thus, although the underlying value may be expected to increase, it is never
expected to become in¯nitely high in ¯nite time. We also assume that the lower boundary is
either natural, exit, or regular. In case it is regular, we assume then it is killing and, therefore,
that the underlying value process ceases to exist whenever it hits the lower boundary of its











We also denote as Ã´(x) the increasing and as '´(x) the decreasing fundamental solutions of the
ordinary linear second order di®erential equation (A´u)(x) = ru(x) (cf. Borodin and Salminen













denotes the density of the scale function of the underlying di®usion.
Having characterized the underlying stochastic value dynamics, we now plan to consider the
optimal timing problem of an irreversible investment opportunity in the presence of both value
3uncertainty and progressive taxation with positive tax rate and tax exemption. More precisely,








where ¿ is an arbitrary stopping time, ¿0 = infft ¸ 0 : Xt · 0g · 1 denotes the potentially
in¯nite date at which the underlying value dynamics vanish (and can, therefore, be interpreted
as a liquidation date), and
¼(x) = x ¡ c ¡ t(x ¡ ¹ x)+;
where ¹ x 2 R+ is a known exogenously given exemption threshold satisfying the condition t¹ x <
c. Our ¯rst results, characterizing the optimal investment rule in the case where exercising
the investment opportunity at states below the exemption threshold ¹ x is suboptimal, are now
summarized in
Lemma 2.1. Assume that ¹ x · c and that for all t 2 [0;1) there is a unique ^ xt such that
(1 ¡ t)(¹(x) ¡ r(x ¡ c)) T rt(¹ x ¡ c); x S ^ xt: (2.3)















t(´)) x < x¤
t(´)
(2.4)
where the optimal investment threshold x¤
t(´) 2 ((c ¡ t¹ x)=(1 ¡ t);1) is the unique root of the







over, the optimal investment threshold is an increasing function and the value of the investment
opportunity is a decreasing function of the tax rate t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1 states a set of weak conditions under which a unique investment threshold at which
the irreversible investment opportunity should be exercised exists and is above the Marshallian
trigger (c¡t¹ x)=(1¡t) at which the net present value of the project becomes positive. According
to Lemma 2.1 increased tax rate decelerates investment and decreases the value of the investment
opportunity whenever the tax exemption threshold is below the sunk cost of investment. The
reason for this observation is due to the fact that although higher tax rate increases the size of
the tax deduction t¹ x it simultaneously decreases the after tax net revenues (1 ¡ t)x of the ¯rm.
Since the latter e®ect dominates whenever the tax exemption threshold is below the sunk cost
of investment we ¯nd that the overall impact of increased taxation on the optimal investment
policy and its value is negative.
The optimal investment rule in the case where ¹ x > c is now summarized in
Theorem 2.2. Assume that c 2 (t¹ x; ¹ x) and that for all t 2 [0;1) there is a unique ^ xt such that








(A) If ¹ x ¸ x¤
0(´) > x¤
t(´) then the investment opportunity is exercised at the investment threshold
x¤
0(´) and the value of the optimal policy reads as
V´(x) =
(






0(´)) x < x¤
0(´);
(2.6)
4where the optimal investment threshold x¤







0(´) > ¹ x > x¤
t(´) then the investment opportunity is exercised at the exemption threshold
¹ x and the value of the optimal policy reads as
V´(x) =
(
(1 ¡ t)(x ¡ c) + t(¹ x ¡ c) x ¸ ¹ x
(¹ x ¡ c)
Ã´(x)




t(´) ¸ ¹ x then the investment opportunity is exercised at the investment threshold
x¤
t(´) and the value of the optimal policy reads as
V´(x) =
(
(1 ¡ t)(x ¡ c) + t(¹ x ¡ c) x ¸ x¤
t(´)
((1 ¡ t)(x¤
t(´) ¡ c) + t(¹ x ¡ c))
Ã´(x)
Ã´(x¤
t(´)) x < x¤
t(´);
(2.8)
where the optimal investment threshold x¤







t(´))t(¹ x¡c). Moreover, increased
taxation accelerates investment dy decreasing the optimal exercise threshold. That is, dx¤
t(´)=dt <
0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2.2 demonstrates that if the tax exemption threshold ¹ x is greater than the sunk
cost c then there are three di®erent cases which may arise depending on the relative sizes of
the parameters of the problem. Interestingly, we ¯nd that under the conditions of Theorem
2.2 a higher tax rate has an positive impact on rational investment. This accelerating e®ect of
increased taxation on the optimal investment policy is based on its negative e®ect on the after tax
costs of investment. More precisely, it is now clear that for all x ¸ ¹ x the after tax net investment
costs are c ¡ t¹ x. This, in turn, means that the investor can deduct t¹ x from the tax base. Since
this deduction is an increasing function of the tax rate, we ¯nd that although a higher tax rate
decreases the pro¯tability of an irreversible investment project, it simultaneously decreases the
net investment costs. Since the latter e®ect dominates the former when t¹ x < c < ¹ x, we ¯nd
that the net e®ect of increased taxation on optimal investment is unambiguously positive. It is
also worth noticing that Theorem 2.2 also demonstrates that among the potential regimes there
are two interesting special cases resulting into non-standard optimal investment behavior. First,
in both regimes (A) and (B), the optimal investment rule is independent of the tax rate and,
therefore, on those regimes marginal changes in the tax policy do not a®ect investment behavior.
Second, in regime (B) the investment opportunity is exercised at the exemption threshold which
is a constant. Consequently, the optimal investment rule characterized in regime (B) is also
independent of volatility. This observation is important since it characterizes the signi¯cance
of the exceptional incentive e®ects of tax exemption on optimal investment in two ways (cost
deduction and risk-sharing).
Our main results on the comparative static properties of the optimal policy and its value are
now summarized in the following.
Theorem 2.3. Assume that the net appreciation rate ¹(x) ¡ rx is non-increasing and that
¹(0) · 0 whenever 0 is attainable for the underlying value process. Assume also that for all
t 2 [0;1) there is a unique ^ xt such that inequality (2.3) is satis¯ed. Then, increased volatility
increases the value of the investment opportunity and decelerates rational exercise by increasing or
leaving unchanged the optimal investment threshold at which the opportunity should be exercised.
More precisely, if ^ ´ ¸ ´ then x¤
t(^ ´) ¸ x¤
t(´) and V^ ´(x) ¸ V´(x) for all t 2 [0;1).
Proof. See Appendix C.
5Theorem 2.3 states a set of weak conditions under which increased volatility unambiguously
increases both the value and the exercise threshold of the optimal policy. This observation is of
interest since as Theorem 2.2 clearly indicates, increased volatility may result into a transition
from the regime (A) towards regime (B) and then further into regime (C). Moreover, since
increased volatility does not a®ect the optimal investment threshold in regime (B), we observe
that the set where investment is volatility-independent may be relatively large. In order to
characterize such a situation explicitly, we now prove the following key result illustrating the
signi¯cance of progressive taxation as a risk-sharing device.
Theorem 2.4. Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2.3 are satis¯ed, that t¹ x < c < ¹ x, that
¹(¹ x) < r(¹ x ¡ c), and that lim´!1 Ã´(¹ x)=Ã0
´(¹ x) > (¹ x ¡ c)=(1 ¡ t). Then there are two critical
volatility multipliers ´¤
1 < ´¤
2 satisfying the conditions
Ã´¤
1(¹ x) = Ã0
´¤
1(¹ x)(¹ x ¡ c) (2.9)
and
(1 ¡ t)Ã´¤
2(¹ x) = Ã0
´¤
2(¹ x)(¹ x ¡ c): (2.10)
Moreover, if ´ · ´¤
1 then the conditions of part (A) of Theorem 2.2 are satis¯ed and the value
reads as in (2.6), if ´¤
1 < ´ < ´¤
2 then the conditions of part (B) of Theorem 2.2 are satis¯ed
and the value reads as in (2.7), and if ´ ¸ ´¤
2 then the conditions of part (C) of Theorem 2.2 are
satis¯ed and the value reads as in (2.8).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Essentially Theorem 2.4 states a set of conditions under which the the optimal threshold







t(´) ´ ¸ ´¤
2
¹ x ´¤
1 < ´ < ´¤
2
x¤
0(´) ´ · ´¤
1
This result is important since it is valid for a broad class of processes modelling the underlying
stochastic revenue dynamics. Especially, it is worth emphasizing that the condition that ¹(¹ x) <
r(¹ x ¡ c) is su±cient for the existence of a critical volatility multiplier ´¤
1. Thus, the transition
from from regime (A) to regime (B) as volatility increases is always guaranteed as long as the
exemption threshold dominates the optimal investment threshold in the absence of uncertainty
and taxation. Hence, a regime where investment is independent of both volatility and taxation
always exists as long as the exemption threshold dominates the optimal investment threshold in
the absence of uncertainty and taxation. If ¹(¹ x) ¸ r(¹ x¡c) then a critical volatility multiplier ´¤
1
satisfying (2.9) does not exist and in that case the only potential regimes are either (B) or (C).
3 Explicit Illustration
After having characterized our new theoretical results concerning the relationship between the
tax rate and the investment threshold as well as the relationship between the investment thresh-
old and the volatility of value process, we now illustrate our results explicitly within a frequently
applied setting. More speci¯cally, we show how the relationship between the investment thresh-
old, tax rate and volatility depends on the relative size of the tax exemption and the sunk cost.
In particular, under progressive taxation when tax exemption exceeds sunk cost of investment
there is a non-empty set of volatilities where the optimal investing threshold does not depend on
the volatility of value process at all.
6Let us assume that the underlying value dynamics evolve according to an ordinary geometric
Brownian motion characterized by the stochastic di®erential equation
dXt = ¹Xtdt + ¾XtdWt; X0 = x;
where ¹ 2 R+ and ¾ 2 R+ are exogenously given constants. It is now a standard exercise to



































denotes the negative root of the quadratic characteristic equation ¾2a(a ¡ 1) ¡ 2¹a ¡ 2r = 0.
Given these observations we ¯nd that our Lemma 2.1 can be re-expressed in this particular
example as
Lemma 3.1. Assume that ¹ x · c and that the absence of speculative bubbles condition r > ¹,
guaranteeing the ¯niteness of the value of the optimal policy, is satis¯ed. Then, the value of the
optimal policy reads as
V¾(x) =
(











®¾(c ¡ t¹ x)







r(c ¡ t¹ x)
(r ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ t)
is the optimal investment threshold at which the irreversible investment opportunity should be





®¾(c ¡ ¹ x)





2®¾(c ¡ t¹ x)
(®¾ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ t)¾(®¾ ¡ ¯¾)
> 0:
Thus, in the present example both increased tax rate and increased volatility raises the optimal
investment threshold and, therefore, postpone the rational exercise of the investment opportu-
nity. Especially, if ¹ x < c then along the iso-incentive curve where investment incentives remain








2(1 ¡ t)(c ¡ t¹ x)
¾(c ¡ ¹ x)(®¾ ¡ ¯¾)
< 0:
An important implication of Lemma 3.1 is that
x¤
t(¾) >
r(c ¡ t¹ x)
(r ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ t)
>
(c ¡ t¹ x)
(1 ¡ t)
:
This means that the optimal investment threshold dominates the certainty trigger characterizing
the optimal policy in the absence of volatility. This trigger, in turn, dominates the Marshallian
threshold at which the net present value of the project becomes positive.










    constant
Figure 1: The iso-incentive curve
In order to characterize the case where the tax exemption rule is bene¯cial for the investment
opportunity (i.e., when t¹ x < c < ¹ x) we ¯rst observe that if r > ¹ then in the absence of taxation













(®¾ ¡ 1)¾(®¾ ¡ ¯¾)
> 0:
Thus, we ¯nd that the results of our main Theorem 2.2 can now be expressed as follows.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that t¹ x < c < ¹ x, r > ¹, and rc < (r ¡ ¹)¹ x. Then there are two critical
volatility coe±cients ¾¤
1 < ¾¤
2 satisfying the conditions
¹ x = ®¾¤
1(¹ x ¡ c) (3.2)
and
(1 ¡ t)¹ x = ®¾¤
2(¹ x ¡ c): (3.3)
(A) If ¾ · ¾¤
1 then the investment opportunity is exercised at the investment threshold x¤
0(¾) and
the value of the optimal policy reads as
V¾(x) =
(








1 < ¾ < ¾¤
2 then the investment opportunity is exercised at the exemption threshold ¹ x
and the value of the optimal policy reads as
V¾(x) =
(
(1 ¡ t)(x ¡ c) + t(¹ x ¡ c) x > ¹ x
(¹ x ¡ c)(x=¹ x)®¾ x < ¹ x:
(3.5)
(C) If ¾ ¸ ¾¤
2 then the investment opportunity is exercised at the investment threshold x¤
t(¾) and
the value of the optimal policy reads as
V¾(x) =
(
(1 ¡ t)(x ¡ c) + t(¹ x ¡ c) x > x¤
t(¾)
((1 ¡ t)(x¤
t(¾) ¡ c) + t(¹ x ¡ c))(x=x¤
t(¾))®¾ x < x¤
t(¾)
(3.6)
8Theorem 3.2 states a set of conditions under which the optimal investment rule is determined
by the volatility of the underlying value process. Interestingly, as we already argued in the gen-
eral analysis of the optimal investment problem, we ¯nd that if the conditions of Theorem 3.2
are satis¯ed, then there is a non-empty set of volatilities (the set (¾¤
1;¾¤
2)) where the optimal
investment rule is completely independent of the volatility of the value process. A second im-
portant consequence of Theorem 3.2 is that depending on the volatility of the underlying value
dynamics, the optimal investment rule may be independent of the tax rate (on the set (0;¾¤
2)).
Consequently, as was already indicated by our Theorem 2.4, there is a regime where the optimal
investment policy is independent of both the tax rate and the volatility of the underlying value
process. Under such circumstances neither the tax rate nor the volatility will have no e®ect on
the investment threshold even while they do a®ect the value of the investment opportunity. These
observations are explicitly illustrated in Figure 2. Finally, as was already found in our Theorem
2.4, for su±ciently high volatilities an increased tax rate will accelerate rational investment by
decreasing the optimal investment threshold while increased volatility will have the opposite ef-
fect by decreasing the investment incentives. This means that under such circumstances the tax
authorities may weaken the negative impact of volatility on rational investment by raising the
tax rate. Hence our model emphasizes the signi¯cance of an active tax policy as a stabilizing
mechanism in the presence of progressive taxation, irreversibility, and uncertainty (cf. Dixit and
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Figure 2: The optimal exercise threshold as a function of the volatility coe±cient ¾
It is, however, worth noticing that if rc > (r ¡ ¹)¹ x then equation (3.2) does not have an
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we observe that if (1 ¡ t)¹¹ x > r(¹ x ¡ c) then neither equation (3.2) nor equation (3.3) can have
an interior root and, therefore, in that case the only possible regime is (C).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the following issue: what is the impact of tax progression -
de¯ned as a higher average tax rate in terms of tax base - on irreversible investment under
uncertainty? We have demonstrated several new and interesting ¯ndings about this practically
realistic modelling of taxation. Under progressive taxation with tax rate and tax exemption,
we have shown how the impact of the tax rate on the optimal investment threshold depends
on the relative size between the tax exemption and the sunk cost of investment. If the tax
9exemption threshold is below the sunk cost of investment, then higher tax rate will increase the
optimal investment threshold and decrease the value of investment opportunity by decreasing
the net-of-tax payo®. The negative relationship under these assumptions is natural; higher tax
rate raises the size of tax deduction, and decreases the marginal revenue from investment project.
Since the latter e®ect dominates whenever the tax exemption threshold is below the sunk cost
of investment, we ¯nd that a higher tax rate decelerates optimal investments.
But when the tax exemption threshold exceeds the sunk cost of irreversible investment, then
depending on the relationship between volatility and other parameters of the problem, there are
three di®erent regimes in terms of optimal investment threshold. First, for a set of su±ciently
low volatilities, increased volatility decelerates investment by increasing the harvesting threshold,
but tax rate does not a®ect the optimal policy. Second, as volatility becomes larger, the optimal
harvesting threshold coincides with the tax exemption, and therefore becomes independent of
both volatility and tax rate. Third, for a set of su±ciently high volatilities, the optimal invest-
ment threshold depends again positively on volatility, but interestingly, negatively on tax rate.
Under this latter condition there is "tax paradox", according to which higher tax rate acceler-
ates rational investment by increasing the current investment incentives! It is worth noticing
that these observations results also from the fact that in our framework government works as a
risk-sharer via tax exemption.
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A Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. The proof of (2.3) and (2.4) is analogous with the proof of Lemma 2.1 in Alvarez and
Koskela (2004). It is now clear that the ¯rst order optimality condition characterizing the optimal







t(´) ¡ c) =
t
1 ¡ t
(¹ x ¡ c):














by the inequality c ¸ ¹ x and the local convexity of the increasing fundamental solution Ã´(x) at
the optimal boundary. Finally, since the exercise payo® x¡c¡t(x¡¹ x)+ is a decreasing mapping
of the tax rate t on the set (¹ x;1) we ¯nd that increased taxation decreases the value of the
investment opportunity.
B Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proof. In order to prove the results of our theorem, we ¯rst consider the mapping





























It is now clear from this de¯nition that










´(x)t(¹ x¡c) = ((1 ¡t)(¹(x)¡r(x¡c))¡rt(¹ x¡c))Ã´(x)m0
´(x):
Hence, our assumption (2.3) presented in the text implies that for all t 2 [0;1) the mapping
Ft(x) satis¯es the monotonicity condition
F0
t(x) T 0 x S ^ xt:
Moreover, since Lemma 2.1 guarantees the existence of a unique threshold x¤
t(´) 2 ((c¡t¹ x)=(1¡
t);1) satisfying the condition Ft(x¤






t(´)) > 0 proving that x¤
0(´) > x¤
t(´). We also ¯nd that Ft(x) is decreasing on the set
where F0(x) is decreasing.
Given these observations, assume ¯rst that ¹ x > x¤
0(´) > x¤
t(´). Then, the mapping (x ¡
c)=Ã´(x) attains its global maximum on the set (0; ¹ x). Since Ft(x) is decreasing on the set where
F0(x) is decreasing we ¯nd that x¤
0(´) = argmaxf(x ¡ c ¡ t(x ¡ ¹ x)+)=Ã´(x)g and, therefore,
that the proposed value function dominates the exercise payo® (x¡c¡t(x¡¹ x)+) for all x 2 R+.
























It is now a straightforward exercise in ordinary di®erentiation to demonstrate that L0
Ã´(x) =
L0
'´(x) = 0 for all x 2 (0;x¤
0(´)), L0
Ã´(x) = (¹(x) ¡ r(x ¡ c))Ã´(x)m0
´(x) < 0 and L0
'´(x) =
(¹(x) ¡ r(x ¡ c))'´(x)m0
´(x) < 0 for all (x¤
0(´); ¹ x), L0
Ã´(x) = ((1 ¡ t)(¹(x) ¡ r(x ¡ c)) + rt(c ¡
¹ x))Ã´(x)m0
´(x) < 0 and L0
'´(x) = ((1 ¡ t)(¹(x) ¡ r(x ¡ c)) + rt(c ¡ ¹ x))'´(x)m0
´(x) < 0 for all
(¹ x;1). Moreover, since LÃ´(x) is non-positive and L'´(x) is non-negative for all x 2 R+ we
observe that the proposed value function satis¯es the conditions of Proposition 3.3 in Salminen
(1985) and, therefore, constitutes a r-excessive majorant of the exercise payo® x¡c¡t(x¡ ¹ x)+.
Since the value is the smallest of these majorants, we ¯nd that the proposed value is indeed the
value of the optimal policy thus completing the proof of part (A) of our theorem. Establishing
part (B) and part (C) is analogous.
C Proof of Theorem 2.3
Proof. Denote as Ã^ ´(x) the increasing fundamental solution of the ordinary linear second order
di®erential equation ^ ´2¾2(x)u00(x)=2 + ¹(x)u0(x) ¡ ru(x) = 0, where ^ ´ satis¯es the inequality
^ ´ ¸ ´. As was established in Alvarez (2004), the assumed monotonicity of the net appreciation
rate ¹(x) ¡ rx and the boundary condition requiring that ¹(0) · 0 whenever 0 is attainable
for Xt imply that the increasing fundamental solutions Ã´(x) and Ã^ ´(x) are strictly convex and































which proves that increased volatility increases the value of the investment opportunity. On
the other hand, if g(x) is non-decreasing, continuous, and continuously di®erentiable outside on






























which shows that g(x)=Ã^ ´(x) is non-decreasing at any extreme point of g(x)=Ã´(x). Since the
exercise payo® x ¡ c ¡ t(x ¡ ¹ x)+ satis¯es these conditions and the maximum of the mapping
(x ¡ c ¡ t(x ¡ ¹ x)+)=Ã´(x) is unique, we ¯nd that increased volatility increases the optimal
investment threshold, that is, that x¤
t(^ ´) ¸ x¤
t(´).
D Proof of Theorem 2.4
Proof. As was established in Lemma 2.1, the equation
(1 ¡ t)Ã´(x) = Ã0
´(x)((1 ¡ t)x ¡ (c ¡ t¹ x))
has a unique root x¤
t(´) for all t 2 [0;1). According to (A.1) the assumption t¹ x < c < ¹ x
implies that the optimal threshold is a decreasing mapping of the tax rate t and, therefore, that
x¤
t(´) · x¤
0(´) for all t 2 (0;1). However, as was in turn established in Theorem 2.3, increased




t(´) for all tax rates t 2 (0;1) and all ´ > 0. Since the optimal investment threshold
satis¯es in the absence of uncertainty and taxation (i.e. when t = 0 and ´ = 0) the ordinary
¯rst order condition ¹(x¤
0(0)) = r(x¤
0(0) ¡ c) we ¯nd that the assumed monotonicity of the net
appreciation rate ¹(x) ¡ rx and the assumption ¹(¹ x) < r(¹ x ¡ c) imply that ¹ x > x¤
0(0) and,
therefore, that x¤
0(´) · ¹ x as long as ´ · ´¤
1. On the other hand, since Ã´(x)=Ã0
´(x) is increasing
as a function of the volatility multiplier ´, the condition lim´!1 Ã´(¹ x)=Ã0
´(¹ x) > (¹ x ¡ c)=(1 ¡ t)
implies that (1 ¡ t)Ã´(¹ x) > Ã0
´(¹ x)(¹ x ¡ c) for a su±ciently great volatility multiplier ´ and,
therefore, that there is critical volatility multiplier ´¤
2 such that x¤
t(´) ¸ ¹ x as long as ´ ¸ ´¤
2.
The rest of the alleged results follow directly from Theorem 2.1.
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